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Introduction 
A photograph, taken in the German city of Dessau in autumn 1948, shows a policeman 
carrying out traffic policing. He was standing on a pedestal in an empty street crossing with 
ruins in the background.1 The photograph was part of the newspaper coverage of the city’s 
traffic safety week (literally ‘traffic education week’). Historians have examined the problems 
understaffed police forces faced throughout Germany in the immediate post-war years.2 With 
large-scale black market activities, rising crime rates, food and material shortage, marauding 
gangs and badly equipped policemen, traffic education was, we might believe, not high up on 
the official agenda.  
But before the rubble was cleared and well before urban planners implemented ideas 
accommodating traffic through spatial changes and Autostädte,3 traffic education weeks took 
place throughout Germany. Leipzig held its first in December 1945; Hamburg, Berlin 
Dortmund, Lünen and Castrop-Rrauxel followed in late 1946.4 A year later, the Soviet zone of 
occupation staged its safety campaign which was repeated in 1949 by the newly established 
German Democratic Republic. The Federal Republic of Germany followed suit in 1950. 
Traffic safety education and traffic policing happened here, although mass motorisation was 
far from a reality—a fact that already hints at another purpose of these events. 
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 Traffic safety campaigns shed light on the efforts and difficulties of reconstructing 
citizenship in post-1945 Germany. The rebuilding of a democratic German society was 
closely linked to orderly, law-abiding and considerate behaviour—traffic safety events were 
the testing ground for these values. They were designed to create a sense of order, manners 
and civil responsibility in which citizens were urged to participate. Konrad Jarausch’s ‘re-
civilizing process’ of Germans after 1945 also happened on the streets.5 While the difficult 
security situation in post-war Germany and changes to police forces have been well 
documented, the police’s role in traffic education and traffic policing has been neglected for 
this period even though the street as key public space for interactions between the state and its 
citizens has long been of interest for historians.6 
Traffic safety and traffic policing might seem trivial when compared to the massive 
scale of destruction and the equally massive task of reconstruction. But both areas allow us 
insight into notions of order, of allegedly appropriate behaviour of citizens in a new 
democratic society, of efforts to rebuild relations with local authorities and of individual 
responsibility for a wider community. At the same time, official understanding of concepts of 
order and good citizenship clashed with a public who interpreted them selectively, feeling 
little obliged to follow traffic rules or police orders. Unlike other efforts to influence public 
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behaviour, traffic education and traffic policing meant everyday interaction and 
communication between the public and law enforcement agencies. Citizens decided on a daily 
basis to what extent they wanted to obey traffic rules and to contribute to the officially 
proclaimed ‘traffic discipline’-- also referred to as ‘traffic politeness’ or ‘traffic morals.’ The 
examination of post-war etiquette books demonstrates how new codes of conducts and, 
sometimes traditional, social rules were revitalised after the war—but also how they were 
disregarded.7 Something similar was meant to happen on the streets according to a set of 
bourgeois values of appropriate behaviour combined with civil responsibility. 
Responsibilities and duties linked to citizenship were not just communicated top down, 
citizens also showed what they expected. The implicit suggestion that those who did not 
behave correctly and respectfully on the streets were not decent citizens can be turned on its 
head by claiming that local representative of authority can be ignored as long as they did not 
address more urgent problems.8 These conflicts played out in the local environment as state 
representatives and private safety associations clashed with the interpretation of other citizens 
over ‘appropriate’ behaviour as traffic participants and good citizens. Within these debates 
and activities we see democratic civil society in the (re)-making. Boundaries of the 
Rechtsstaat were tested, citizens’ engagement demanded, bourgeois values of politeness, 
manners and  discipline promoted, while, at the same time, over-policing was criticised, rules 
and regulations ignored and individual interests, rather than ‘traffic discipline, followed. My 
article mainly concentrates on West Germany but also includes references to the situation in 
East Germany. 
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Traffic Safety in the Weimar Republic and Nazi Germany 
Traffic safety education and traffic policing in the late 1940s and early 1950s partly grappled 
with similar issues as previous initiatives of the Weimar and Nazi years. The rapidly 
increasing traffic in the 1920s meant that traffic education was an area in which policemen 
were required to act as educators of the public. Traffic safety events were organised on 
regional level in the Weimar years heavily relying on police involvement. In early 1929, a 
nation-wide week to prevent accidents in all spheres of life and work included a strong focus 
on traffic accidents.9  The Prussian Ministry of the Interior reminded policemen already in 
1926 that traffic policing should not come across as petty but as friendly and, above all, 
educational.10  But efforts of lenient and well-meaning policy did not have an impact on 
everyone. The Neue Leipziger Zeitung commented that the city’s cyclists and drivers only 
behaved correctly as long as a policeman was in sight.11 Police forces realised that citizens’ 
behaviour was not just dependent on their knowledge of traffic rules but increasingly on their 
willingness to obey them. The head of Dortmund’s uniformed police concluded that adults 
found it difficult to adapt to new circumstances which made traffic safety education of the 
young even more important.12 Consequently, greater attention was focused on cooperating 
with schools. 
In schools, policemen carried out lectures and practical exercises and from late 1924, the 
police received support in their work through the private association Verkehrswacht. 
Organised in local branches, the Verkehrswacht had its origins in representing the interests of 
auto drivers. It encouraged its male members to note the breaching of traffic rules and to 
communicate these incidents to the local police. By and large, local police authorities liked 
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the cooperation with the Verkehrswacht mainly because the organisation had numerous 
teachers in its ranks who delivered talks in schools. The Verkehrswacht was keen to present 
traffic education as a way of creating a modern ‘traffic accustomed’ generation.13  Berlin 
police officer Seyffahrt explained how this active participation should work: ‘The police need 
everyone, every pedestrian, cyclist, car driver and especially every pupil when the traffic 
should be regulated to prevent accidents. If successful, Germany would not need to be a 
country of police because everyone would be his own policeman.’14 Here the police suggested 
responsible behaviour of every citizen for his/her actions rather than appointing some who 
should monitor the behaviour of others. Occasionally, the police became irritated when the 
Verkehrswacht wanted police powers, e.g. powers to arrest or to fine, for its members. Local 
police from a number of cities stated that Verkehrswacht members had no more powers within 
traffic policing than anyone else.15 Hermann Paetsch, Regierungrsat in the Prussian Ministry 
of the Interior, cautioned that the police should make sure it kept the core expertise and 
authority on areas as accident prevention and traffic education.16  
Initially, the National Socialist take-over of power changed little in relation to traffic 
safety education and traffic policing. But National Socialist rhetoric turned the traffic 
community of the 1920s into a symbol of their Volksgemeinschaft calling those causing 
accidents selfish and egocentric.17 Similarly to the Weimar years, the success of traffic safety 
weeks did not become evident through falling accidents. Therefore, stricter police actions 
were announced.18 It was the nation-wide traffic safety week in late June 1938 that spelled an 
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end to educational efforts and publicly announced harsher fines. Propaganda minister Joseph 
Goebbels stated that this event was the last one in which traffic rules were still explained, any 
wrongdoings afterwards would be severely punished.19  From 1938 onwards, police could 
punish traffic violations without having to involve the legal system. This could mean 
confiscating driver’s licences as well as publicly naming (and shaming) those involved in 
traffic violations.20  
Policemen, local authorities, teachers and private associations had experienced 
throughout the Weimar and the Nazi years that the public differentiated between knowing and 
following traffic regulations. Furthermore, the National Socialists came to realise that their 
alleged traffic community was shaky. In March 1936, the journal Kampf der Gefahr asked the 
public to point out local danger spots on the roads that could be easily abolished. Under the 
heading ‘The street belongs to everyone’, every ‘national comrade’ should participate in this 
little contest to prevent accidents.21 After having looked at the suggestions, the police realised 
that most were complaints rather than constructive proposals. 22  Citizens did use the 
opportunity to make their voices heard but not in the way the organisers had hoped for. The 
beginning of the Second World War substantially reduced civilian traffic and, consequently, 
scaled down traffic education.  
 
Engaging the Public: The Difficulties of Participation  
Scholarship on the post-war years in West Germany has shifted from interpreting this time 
period as complete break with the past (Zero Hour) to a conservative restoration or simply a 
preparation for the Cold War. More recently, historians have interpreted the time period as 
                                                 
19
 J. Goebbels, ‘Verkehrsgemeinschaft ist Volksgemeinschaft’, Die deutsche Polizei, 6, no. 13 (1 July 1938). 
20 Fürmetz, ‘Kampf um den Straßenfrieden’, 202. See also D. Hochstetter, Motorisierung und 
„Volksgemeinschaft.“ Das Nationalsozialistische Kraftfahrkorps (NSKK) 1931-1945 (München 2005). The 
NSKK took over many of the educational tasks previously carried out by the Verkehrswacht from 1936/37 
onwards.  
21
 ‘Ankündigung: Großer Wettbewerb’, Kampf der Gefahr, 2, no.11 (March 1936), 13. 
22
‘Die Straße gehört uns’, Kampf der Gefahr, 3,  no. 12 (April 1937),  9.   
 7
more dynamic suggesting that it was a learning process that selectively incorporated past 
memories and continuities and offered scope for innovation and (re)-learning.23  Within this 
process of re-making and re-defining societal values, traffic education and traffic policing 
provided an important role for the police to contribute to this development—even though the 
police occasionally had to safeguard its competences and powers from other associations.  
Citizens defined and re-defined their role(s) in relation to police policy but also in relation to 
expectations that were linked to their behaviour as good citizens and exemplary traffic 
participants. Within these debates on traffic safety, we can see how larger issues, such as civic 
participation, democratic engagement, liberty vs. state interferences, and the privatisation of 
police tasks, were (re)-negotiated in this newly create democratic society.  
After the end of the Second World War, democracy, Rechtsstaat, re-education and 
citizenship became keywords in the debates that envisioned a new democratic state and a new 
mind-set of the German people. The head of North-Rhine Westphalia’s police department, the 
Social Democrat Siegfried Middelhaufe, emphasised in 1947 that the police should be part of 
this process: ‘… the police also need to contribute to this re-education of the people through 
their work as part of the people.’24 This was easier said than done. The difficulties of police 
forces to re-gain trust from the German public in the immediate post-war years become 
obvious in the monthly reports on the mood of the population. Like in many other cities, the 
public mood in the West German city of Düsseldorf was referred to as ‘hopeless’, ‘desperate’ 
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and ‘worrying’ due to severe food shortage, lack of heating material, inadequate housing and 
high crime rates. In 1948, the annual report of Düsseldorf’s police suggested that a good 
relationship between police and all sections of society still required great patience and much 
work.25 Two years later, the report wrote of ‘a satisfying relationship’ but pointed out that 
‘every German citizen needs to be reminded of his duties—and not just of rights—in the 
democratic state.’26 
 However, there were efforts to start a conversation between the police and the public. 
The police journal Polizei-Praxis put up posters in Frankfurt a. M., Düsseldorf and Stuttgart 
asking for people’s attitudes regarding the following questions: ‘What do you like about the 
new police?, What do you dislike?, What could be improved?’ In December 1948 the journal 
published some of the responses pointing out that the participation of over 500 had been 
unexpectedly high. The reprinted letters were certainly carefully selected and all of them 
praised the friendly, helpful and polite behaviour of the police. Critical points were made, too. 
Black market activities and corruption were not fought enough and the enforcement of traffic 
rules in overfilled trams seemed petty.27 Mrs Erika B. from Frankfurt received the first prize 
for her detailed reply in which she firstly expressed her delight that she as ‘an average 
consumer, medium height, medium bombing damage’ should express her opinion. Among 
other aspects, Mrs B. praised traffic safety weeks but criticised policing of cramped public 
transport.28 These letters provide a glimpse into the public’s ideas about the police’s new 
behaviour and reminded the police of the some of the urgent problems on people’s minds. 
While 500 letters were not an enormous number, it still demonstrates a willingness to 
participate in the shaping of the country. Michaela Fenske shows how letter-writing to 
politicians, ministries and other state authorities in post-1945 West Germany meant an 
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engagement of the individual with the democratic political process which, over time, resulted 
in ‘learning democracy.’29 It was this development the police hoped to encourage.  
The constantly rising number of traffic accidents-especially fatal ones-- caused efforts to 
involve the public into traffic safety measures after the end of the Second Word War. The 
Chamber of Business and Commerce in Bonn found that in 1947 the area of North-Rhine 
Westphalia had far more casualties per car than England or the USA. It suggested that regular 
traffic safety activities were needed because ‘the discipline had suffered through the 
Verwilderung during war time.’30 Statistics for North-Rhine Westphalia from 1947 to 1950 
show increasing traffic accidents; the number of fatal accidents also rose.31  It was the war and 
the chaotic post-war years that were presented as the rupture to orderly, disciplined, polite and 
considerate behaviour here. Similarly, East German newspapers presented ‘traffic discipline’ 
as something that citizens needed to re-learn.32 While policemen could have pointed out that 
the exemplary ‘traffic community’ of the 1920s and 1930s had never existed, the official 
discourse fitted to the way many Germans remembered the past in which the ‘good years’ had 
been the ones before the outbreak of the Second Word War.   
The late 1940s and early 1950s saw a number of strategies to encourage the public to 
react to this rise of traffic accidents. Two films from 1950 and 1951, supported by the police 
forces from Stuttgart and Wiesbaden, made the link between traffic safety and citizens’ duties 
even more obvious. The 1950-documentary film Everyone is a Pedestrian stressed that 
problems of traffic safety were relevant to everyone and that everyone should be part of the 
solution. Stuttgart, the film’s example, had a traffic committee which involved members of 
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the police, industry, civil service, traffic experts, teachers, parents and ordinary citizens. They 
responded to letters and suggestions made by the general public. The film ended with the 
reminder: ‘Every constructive suggestion is welcomed. Wherever you live, you need to 
help—everyone is a pedestrian and everyone is a contributor to solving the traffic problem.’33 
A year later, Munich had a similar committee. These activities tried to involve the individual 
citizen and, at the same time, suggested that the police reacted to problems together with the 
public.34 The film Citizens in Uniform from 1951 presented the official message of West 
Germany’s police by portraying one day of a policeman filled with helpful tasks and the film 
concluded: ‘And now we know that policemen are citizens just like us, citizens in uniform.’ 
The audience should not make the job of the police even more difficult by traffic violations.35  
While both films continued police efforts to re-gain public trust, they also asked for active 
participation.  
Not everyone appreciated these initiatives and some felt that the line to denouncing 
fellow citizens had been crossed. The liberal weekly journal Die Zeit criticised in March 1952  
a voluntary organisation in Hamburg called ‘the community of traffic friends’ whose 
members reported traffic violations to the police. Allegedly, the police responded with letters 
thanking for their help and advising them to bring even more people to the attention of the 
police. Die Zeit argued that Hamburg’s police encouraged the denunciation of citizens and 
that this was hardly compatible with the values of a democratic society.36 The police journal 
Die Polizei investigated these claims. According to Hamburg’s police, its ‘community of 
traffic friends’ consisted of 300 experienced drivers who had been selected based on their 
excellent driving record. They had no police powers but were asked to remind people about 
correct behaviour, to report wrongdoings and to inform the police of exemplary behaviour too. 
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To make sure the ‘traffic friends’ knew what they should look for, Hamburg’s police handed 
out short forms on which the appropriate traffic violation(s) should be ticked and combined 
with the licences plate number of the vehicle and the name of the person observing. These 
reports had consequences as the police asked those who had been reported repeatedly to come 
to the police station and to be instructed about the dangers of their behaviour. Also Munich’s 
police operated a similar policy. However, Munich seemed to have had more problems with 
those who had been reported as 40% turned to the courts to protest. 37 
 These efforts to engage citizens clashed with difficulties of channelling their 
participation within legitimised democratic bodies. We also find a lack of unified official 
policy that regulated engagement and cooperation of the police with voluntary associations. 
Sace Elder suggests that the police’s encouragement of public engagement in the Weimar 
Republic helped in creating the denunciatory framework of the Third Reich. It was this legacy 
and the blurred boundaries between denunciations, surveillance and engaged/ concerned 
citizens that created difficulties in the early 1950s, a time period when civilian officials and 
the police, as Larry Frohman states, debated the importance of registry lists and population 
surveillance in West Germany. 38 However, the police did not react to everything the public 
reported and the public were often reluctant in reporting what the police wanted to know. 
Gerhard Fürmetz shows for post-war Bavaria that citizens told the police little on black 
market activities even though the authorities were keenly interested, while the police reacted 
reluctantly to reports on neighbourhood disputes.39  
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The messy relationship between reporting and denouncing became even more 
complicated when voluntary organisations were involved.40 Certainly the most interesting and 
ambivalent organisation within the spectrum of ‘traffic friends’ and other community traffic 
safety groups was the West German Verkehrswacht. Efforts to re-initiate the Verkehrswacht 
in 1946, stressing its root in Weimar democracy, were supported by one of its members with 
the suggestion that appropriate behaviour of all traffic participants introduced young people 
‘to life in a democratic state.’ 41  Here we find the link between traffic education and 
citizenship underpinned by assumptions about a generation that needed to be ‘trained’ to 
behave correctly on the streets but also, and more importantly, to participate in a democratic 
state in which rules, laws and duties applied to everyone. Even though local branches of the 
Verkehrswacht had been re-founded before 1950, it was then when the Federal Ministry of 
Traffic agreed to the Bundes-Verkehrswacht as umbrella organisation to unite its numerous 
regional branches. While the Bundes-Verkehrswacht was financially supported by West 
Germany’s federal government, regional organisations had to secure their funding from 
German states. The members of the organisation worked on a voluntary basis.42  By late 1956 
circa 500 local organisations existed in West Germany (including West Berlin) with most in 
North-Rhine Westphalia followed by Bavaria.43 The head of the Verkehrswacht for NRW, Dr 
Arndt, even presented the organisation’s importance as essential for democracy because it 
provided a voice for the general public to counterbalance or, at least, negotiate the 
implementation of state measures regarding traffic policy.44  
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 Local Verkehrswachten were never intended to carry out police tasks or act with police 
powers. Explaining, educating and enlightening the public on traffic regulations and traffic 
safety were the organisation’s areas. Cases in which Verkehrswacht members reported traffic 
violations to the police or encouraged others to report wrongdoings to them to pass on these 
claims were one of the organisation’s more fiercely debated activities. Leading voices within 
the Verkehrswacht had seemingly few problems with this practice. The head of the 
Bundesverkehrswacht Dr Enno Becker explained in 1952 that the ‘pest of traffic accidents’ 
could only be tackled through daily work that established personal contacts with ‘traffic 
sinners.’ One way of doing so, according to Becker, meant that members of the 
Verkehrswacht wrote down licence plate numbers of those breaching traffic rules and then 
sent personal letters to them. He ensured that this was a very successful method as long as it 
was not used to denounce people. 45  A representative of the Interior Minister of Baden-
Württemberg praised the Verkehrswacht as a civilian organisation that replaced the Germans’ 
traditional trust in authorities with individual responsibility. 46  But the fact that the 
Verkehrswacht had to stress repeatedly that the aim was not to spy and denounce people 
suggests problems with these methods.  
Police and local authorities were well aware that encouraging some to report on others 
could have unwanted effects. Bavaria’s police believed that information provided by the 
Verkehrswacht would not hold up in court and, therefore, ignored offers from the organisation 
to expand its programme of reporting people who had been seen breaching traffic 
regulations.47 Allegedly more positive results with reports from the public came when the 
Automobile Association ADAC asked 2,500 of its member in the mid-1950s to report 
dangerous spots on the roads.48 The minister of the interior of Schleswig-Holstein pointed out 
that only reports on dangerous spots were asked for and not on the behaviour of others as one 
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did not want to support denunciations.49 North-Rhine Westphalia’s minister for the economy 
and traffic saw this differently and reported that already in 1952 specially selected and 
reliable members of the Verkehrswacht had been asked to report dangerous spots and traffic 
violations. According to the minister, these reports had not been misused for the purpose of 
denunciations.50  
Not all initiatives suggested along these lines were considered appropriate and in some 
cases enthusiastic citizens were reminded of the boundaries of the Rechtsstaat. When Julius 
B., a member of the Verkehrswacht, volunteered as an auxiliary police officer and suggested 
that he and others could fine drivers on the spot, North-Rhine Westphalia’s minister of the 
Interior reminded him that police powers remained confined to the police.51 Hans B. found 
that a selected group of people (members of the ADAC or the Verkehrswacht) should report 
traffic violations on a postcard. When three had been received referring to the same licence 
plate, the car owner had to pay a fine. The federal minister of traffic pointed out that fines 
could only be imposed by the police and that anonymous reports would not hold up in court 
and would probably lead to a flood of wrong denunciations.52 This issue of encouraging 
individual contributions, participation and ‘education’ of fellow citizens on the one hand 
without creating an atmosphere of denunciations illustrates the difficulties of using ‘orderly 
behaviour’ as key concept of re-constructing societies. Equally difficult was to rely on semi-
private associations as watchdogs. 
 
Public Performance of Orderly Behaviour: Traffic Education Weeks  
Another way of engaging the population was the staging of traffic education weeks which 
publicly put the behaviour of individuals under the spotlight. Often these events were 
organised locally and one of the first after the end of the war was carried in Leipzig in 
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November 1945.  The city’s school children attended talks by police and citizens living in 
rural areas around Leipzig were reminded that traffic regulations were still in place implicitly 
suggesting that the end of the war did not mean an end to all regulations. High fines would be 
imposed on those who did not show ‘traffic discipline’, so the police.53 Also Hamburg’s 
police concentrated its early traffic safety weeks in late 1946 on school children.54 Similar 
localised events were carried out in Dortmund, Berlin, Lünen, Castrop-Rauxel and the area of 
Brandenburg in 1946. The trinity of public order, discipline and education was obvious in all 
of the traffic safety activities in East and West Germany. Equally similar were the difficulties 
of getting the message across to the public.  
In 1947 the Soviet occupation zone staged a traffic education week throughout its five 
states and reported disappointing results. The East German newspaper Tägliche Rundschau 
lamented that many behaved recklessly and ‘sleepwalked’ along the roads. Parents were told 
that the ruins of bombed out houses were certainly not a safe place for children to play but 
neither were the streets. 55  The Sächsische Zeitung clearly linked traffic safety to civil 
responsibility: ‘The traffic education week has to show to our population that voluntary order 
and self-discipline need to be a necessity, in fact a democratic duty in a democratic state.’56  
In fact, the report from Saxony grappled particularly with the seemingly lack of willingness of 
the public. While it praised the good involvement of primary school children and their 
teachers, this remained an exception: ‘Only a small proportion of the population show an 
understanding of the importance of traffic education and of police measures related to this 
field. The majority was against any education or only behaved correctly as long as seen by the 
police and engaged in indifferent and inconsiderate habits as soon as police were out of 
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sight.’57  It was not just the public’s indifference that irritated the police, but their often 
demonstrative challenges to traffic regulations. Richard Bessel reminds us that East 
Germany’s police were considered by many in the early post-war years as not getting 
involved in areas that mattered to the public, while they policed activities seen as 
unnecessary.58 This suggestion echoed public sentiments in West Germany and can probably 
partly explain the behaviour encountered by the police. 
West Germany lagged behind in regards to big and centrally organised traffic education 
weeks with the first nation-wide one in 1950. In Düsseldorf, the envisioned event in 1947 was 
cancelled due to a lack of resources.59 Despite these early setbacks, Düsseldorf often served as 
testing ground for traffic safety initiatives before they were rolled out throughout North-Rhine 
Westphalia (NRW). Wilhelm Vonolfen, a former teacher and the Ministry of Culture and 
Education’s representative on NRW’s traffic committee, pointed out that traffic safety had not 
been dealt with for 14 years and, therefore, teachers needed to be trained again in this area.60 
He neglected his own activities. There was, by no means, a lack of activities when the Nazis 
came to power and he had been an active contributor to the Verkehrswacht’s journal in the 
Weimar and the Nazi period.61  
In September 1947, the NRW Ministry of the Interior advised local police stations to 
pay particular attention to traffic education as the first six months of the year had already seen 
612 fatal casualties due to traffic accidents.62 A list of causes for traffic accidents placed 
inattentiveness, recklessness and inconsideration as top three followed by poor conditions of 
vehicles, ‘the current food situation and the general exhaustion of the public leading to slower 
reaction time’ and the long interruption of efficient traffic education. The Ministry of the 
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Interior put the blame for accidents largely on the behaviour of public which, consequently, 
needed more education. This education was not solely the responsibility of the police but 
involved teachers, parents and everyone else stressing that traffic accidents happened 
regardless of class, age or gender.63  Once again we find efforts to reach beyond the directly 
concerned local authorities and to present traffic safety as a communal task of an educated 
and engaged public. At the same time, not everyone of this public seemed to be equally 
suitable to participate. With phrases similar to East Germany, the urban public was described 
as ‘numb and indifferent’ concluding with the extraordinary remark that parents who were not 
teaching their children on traffic dangers were to be blamed in case the children suffered fatal 
accidents.64  Unlike other areas in the immediate post-war year in which ‘a crisis of the youth’ 
was proclaimed due to the alleged Verwilderung and lawlessness of young people,65 traffic 
safety debates suggested that the behaviour of adults was considered as equally inadequate.   
Commenting directly on the police, the report from 1947 described the traffic safety of 
any given area as ‘a mirror of police discipline, education and police achievements.’ 
Furthermore, policemen were reminded that helping the elderly as well as children 
demonstrated that the police were truly connected to the people: ‘…and whoever believes that 
these actions are below his dignity or not masculine enough has not understood the deeper 
meaning of his profession and cannot be a policeman in a democratic state.’66 This is a 
surprising comment because North-Rhine Westphalia’s police did not depend on women 
involved in traffic policing and the image presented here of the policeman as friend and helper 
for the vulnerable sections of society had a long tradition. For some, more pastoral police 
tasks seemed to counteract a strong masculine idea of law and order enforcement. Generally 
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speaking, the discourses, policy making and law enforcements regarding traffic education and 
traffic policing in West Germany were dominated by men in the late 1940s and 1950s. 
Policing and law enforcement was carried out by male police officers and also the leading 
figures of local Verkehrswachten were men and so were civilian officials in the responsible 
ministries. That the framework of the allegedly inclusive ‘traffic community’ was determined 
by men might not come as a surprise given the nature of the organisations involved. However, 
East Germany relied heavily on police women in traffic policing and traffic education—partly 
based on a lack of manpower but also because women were believed to establish a better 
rapport with the public and especially with children.67 
When the first nationally organised traffic education week happed in West Germany in 
1950, this type of public event was already under scrutiny as possibly not delivering the 
envisioned results and as being too costly. The arguments were similar to the ones made in 
East Germany, but despite concerns in both German states, traffic education weeks remained 
a long-lasting annual (sometimes bi-annual) feature of traffic education. While the federal 
minister of traffic supported the safety weeks, the Verkehrswacht stressed that these events 
could only contribute to continuous traffic education carried out by their local organisations.68   
Even though the early 1950s did not see the same level of indifference that police forces 
found in the late 1940s, the ‘success rate’ of these activities were not convincing for everyone. 
Some in the Verkehrswacht found that public space could not be used equally well 
everywhere and that big traffic safety events would have a better impact in small and 
medium-size towns. Citizens of big cities, so the argument, were used to big and sensational 
events that they did not care anymore about traffic safety weeks. 69  To reinforce its 
importance as local guardian of traffic education, the Verkehrswacht stressed the small-scale 
daily work that needed to be invested into this area. In fact, in the late 1950s the 
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Verkehrswacht described the importance of big traffic education campaigns mainly due to the 
indifferent and apathetic behaviour of those who could only be reached by big-scale events.70 
The patronising and authoritarian tone of the organisation seemed to have now been 
complemented by slight dislike for those the Verkehrswacht was meant to reach. When traffic 
safety weeks were envisioned as activities that could publicly demonstrate the good relations 
between police and public as well as impose pressure on individual behaviour, the reality was 
often far behind these expectations. The call for stricter regulations and punishment seemed 
logical for those involved in traffic education who felt frustrated by the public’s seemingly 
reluctance to cooperate and to take their duties as citizens in the new democratic society 
seriously.  
The moderate suggestion of Fritz Stiebitz, teaching at the police school in Hiltrup, who 
felt that the concept of ‘traffic education’ was problematic because adults did not want to be 
publicly ‘educated’ or even told off and that possibly ‘traffic advice’ could be its replacement, 
did not reach a wide audience.71 Already ten years earlier, Fritz Henkel had hoped that East 
Germany’s ‘traffic education weeks’ could soon be renamed to ‘accidents prevention weeks’ 
as the education of the public would not be needed anymore.72 Both men had a valid point 
with their suggestion of re-considering, among other aspects, the language used for these 
events. Traffic safety activities were in East and West Germany compounded in ‘traffic 
education weeks’ that allowed adults little more engagement and participation than publicly 
demonstrating orderly behaviour under the watchful eyes of the police. This might not only 
have rekindled memories of a very different time period in which participation in publicly 
staged events was expected but also might have reminded many of the negative connotations 
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liked to the word ‘re-education’ in the post-war period. Allied policy quickly changed their 
phrasing from re-education to re-orientation.73  
 
Policing and Pedagogy: Traffic Safety between Fines and Education 
When traffic education was presented as education to civil responsibility, Rechtsstaat and 
democratic participation, higher fines and severe consequences for those breaching traffic 
rules needed a special justification. At a Düsseldorf press conference on traffic education in 
October 1949, ministerial director Leo Brandt addressed this aspect. He found that high fines, 
severe penalties, Sunday lessons and court proceedings sounded like the kind of state 
interference ‘every freedom-loving citizen’ was happy to have overcome and that they 
reminded of the Nazi state. But this should not lead to a situation, argued Brandt, where these 
interferences were impossible and he demanded more help from the press for strict measures 
against the violation of traffic rules.74 He also criticised Allied policy that restricted some of 
the previous measures such as fining on the spot, naming and shaming ‘traffic sinners’, 
lessons on Sunday or letting air out of tyres-- only because they had been practiced in Nazi 
Germany.75  
Sometimes also state institutions did not see eye to eye in these efforts. In early 1950, 
the federal minister of traffic Dr Seebohm announced a new ‘name and shame’ campaign 
suggesting that police forces should give the full name and address of those who caused 
accidents due to too much alcohol to the local newspaper. 76   North-Rhine Westphalia’s 
minister of the interior Dr Menzel pointed out to the police that this announcement of the 
federal minister should not be put into practice as it was outdated and not practical. 77  
Furthermore, North-Rhine Westphalia’s ministry found that publicly naming and shaming 
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should be considered as Nazi practice and was, therefore, not to be carried out.78 Also the 
journal Die Polizei warned that the police were not getting involved in these activities due to 
its similarities with the Nazi era.79  
While publicly naming and shaming people in the press reminded some of methods used 
in Nazi Germany, so did traffic controls carried out by plain-clothes police officers. In 
February 1952, North-Rhine Westphalia’s minister of the Interior found that the use of plain-
clothes officers was an appropriate way to act against the lack of discipline on the roads and 
recommended these actions to local police forces.80 By and large, the district presidents from 
North-Rhine Westphalia reported back positive experiences from their police forces.81 All 
reports stressed, however, that the press did not react positively to these measures. 
Furthermore, the president of the Munich branch of the ADAC could hardly hide his anger 
regarding the actions of the police in North-Rhine Westphalia and wrote to the interior 
minister that controls carried out by plain-clothes police officers were incompatible with the 
constitution and Germany’s democratic state. He demanded that these clandestine ‘Gestapo 
methods’ needed to stop as they undermined the trust in the Rechtsstaat, negated the image of 
the police as ‘friend and helper’ and reminded of the police state Germany once was. 
Furthermore, the ADAC’s president claimed that numerous angry letters from the public had 
made these points.82  
While the ADAC’s effort to intervene did not create a change of policy, two years later, 
in 1954 also the press loudly criticised controls by plain-clothes policemen. In December 
1952 West Germany had, also due to the lobbying of automobile associations, abolished the 
speed limit. The impact on traffic accidents was disastrous and in 1957 the speed limit was re-
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introduced.83  Not surprisingly, the East German press commented on the abolition of the 
speed limit and its literally deadly consequences as further proof of West Germany’s 
failings.84 When North-Rhine Westphalia’s traffic minister Arthur Sträter announced a big 
traffic policing event in which plain-clothes and uniformed police officers controlled the 
traffic in January 1954, the newspapers offered mixed views on these actions. The Essener 
Allgemeine Zeitung pointed out that already the announcements of more controls had positive 
effects. 85  Die Zeit called the shift to more controls and higher fines ‘brutal’, while the 
Westdeutsche Tageblatt commented ironically that the traffic minister pretended that ‘car 
drivers were collective murderers’ and that harsher fines were only imposed to pretend that 
the minister was doing something.86 And the Welt am Sonnabend reported that the minister 
was hunting down car drivers and that ‘police terror’ was certainly not the right method to 
increase traffic safety. Der Mittag agreed and concluded that only an impressive success 
could justify such methods.87  Also Die Polizei found that phrases like ‘the fear of the police’ 
and ‘brutal penalties’ used by North-Rhine Westphalia’s traffic minister were neither 
appropriate to enhance traffic safety nor to improve the relationship between the police and 
the public.88 This time it was the press and the police arguing that state initiatives had gone 
too far and infringed on citizens’ liberties.  
In fact, Sträter and his strict actions were even referred to in the West German 
parliament in a debate on traffic policy in early February 1954 which expressed the 
helplessness of politicians on this issue.  While CDU and FDP representatives agreed that 
they did not want an overuse of policemen monitoring citizens and, therefore, questioned the 
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usefulness of Sträter’s initiatives, the suggested solutions remained vague. The SPD speaker 
agreed that ‘traffic discipline’ would only work if the public volunteered to behave correctly 
rather than forced to do. The politicians concluded by suggesting traffic education in schools, 
an appeal demanding ‘traffic politeness’ and intensified work of the automobile associations 
to create exemplary and tactful drivers.89   
Since April 1950, North-Rhine Westphalia’s police could do something police officials 
and traffic experts had wanted to do for the last five years but British concerns had delayed its 
implementation; police could fine on the spot for traffic violations. The fine was 1DM and 
had to be paid immediately. This was a policy the police could already implement in the 
1920s and 1930s and it was seen as particularly efficient as traffic violations had immediate 
consequences. 90  Even though this measure was long asked for, it did not translate into 
noticeable success—as Düsseldorf’s annual police report for 1951—stated. 91 A report on 
traffic safety in West Germany to the Allied High Commission underlined in September 1952 
that neither this policy nor the use of plain-clothes policemen were considered as adequate 
ways of tackling the ‘traffic problem.’92  Seven years after the end of the Second World War, 
the report found traffic education particularly important ‘because many here have experienced 
a time period of massive destruction of human lives and human values. Given these 
circumstances, a strong re-education is needed and it is a necessity to re-educate adults to 
traffic safety.’93 The report praised police efforts in the area of school education but found 
that school authorities needed to support these efforts in greater extent. Not surprisingly, the 
report commended the work of the Verkehrswacht considering its local organisations as a 
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great way of supporting democratic ideas through public’s participation.94  By late 1952, 
German authorities already knew how difficult traffic education of adults actually was and 
had some experience with the sometimes overzealous Verkehrswacht members.  
 GDR efforts to engage and educate the public in traffic safety measures were partly 
similar to those in the FRG as we have already seen in traffic education weeks. However, the 
opportunity to rely on state organisations as e.g. the country’s youth organisations, the 
centrally organised support for the police (the ABV or police volunteers) and associations that 
ensured security and safety in factory plants allowed for a more centralised approach—even 
though this did not necessarily mean more success. Similarly to the FRG, not all efforts to 
engage a wider section of the population were seen as legitimate. Experiments in Dresden and 
Chemnitz in the late 1950s involved the Verkehrsaktive, voluntary associations that monitored 
traffic safety in industrial and agricultural work premises, to check on the behaviour of the 
general public in the centre of both cities. The initiatives were eventually stopped due to 
interventions of the main office of police in Berlin pointing out that police powers (as 
stopping cars or even arresting drivers) could not be given to any other organisation but the 
police. Suggestions to uniform or equip volunteers with traffic policing equipment were 
considered as unacceptable and any efforts in this direction were abandoned.95  
While traffic education of adults seemed to stagnate, it was work with children and 
pupils that triggered innovative initiatives. In line with suggestions already formulated in the 
1920s and 1930s, the focus shifted to young people and school activities. Educational and 
school reforms were key areas of re-education in post-1945 German society and have been 
focus upon in detail by historical studies.96 Traffic safety education in schools has not been 
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discussed in these works as they often focus on more explicitly pronounced educational 
reforms. But as we have already seen with adults, traffic education targeted at youngsters 
combined correct behaviour on the roads with good citizenship contributing to participating in 
civil society. Despite lobbying from numerous circles, traffic safety education never became 
an independent subject established as part of the school’s curriculum neither in East nor West 
Germany. However, it was carried out as an ‘extra’ activity at certain points during the school 
year and within a school context including a number of different agents; namely policemen, 
teachers, and members of the Verkehrswacht. In the city of Münster, the police communicated 
traffic violations from pupils directly to the schools. Schools contacted the parents and the 
teachers and used the individual cases to talk about the dangers on the roads.97 Practical 
exercises were carried out as well and in these police officers were particularly involved. 
These could include showing children how to safely cross a busy street as well as testing 
pupils’ abilities to safely ride a bicycle.98 In fact, successful passing of the ‘bicycle test’ was 
believed ‘to strengthen the responsibility for the traffic community of the future traffic-
generation.’99  
Even more focus on individual responsibility for the traffic community was placed on 
training pupils to become safety patrols and to help their younger schoolmates to get to school 
safely and, especially, to cross busy streets. Tried out on local level already in 1948, North-
Rhine Westphalia introduced a trial run for safety patrols carried out by pupils over 13 years 
in Düsseldorf, Münster and Cologne in 1952. The education of the safety patrols was carried 
out by the police. Parents were reassured that their children did not act as ‘teenage traffic 
police.’100 The federal minister for traffic recommended this idea to be implemented in all 
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German states and praised the safety patrols as role models for their fellow pupils as it taught 
‘to serve, to protect and to decide.’101 Wiesbaden’s head of the police announced in the local 
newspaper: ‘The police need you; you should become a helper of the police!’ A sentence that 
needed to be clarified quickly as parents initially feared that their children were meant to 
actually help with police work.102  The idea of the safety patrols spread to numerous cities and 
German states and was officially sanctioned by the federal minister of traffic in 1953, 
approximately 8,000 boys and girls took part.103 But this success also triggered fears of ‘a new 
uniformed youth organisation’ which reminded some of the Nazi years.104 Police authorities 
were keen to disperse these fears and to support the safety patrols as it was considered to an 
effective way of traffic safety education and it guaranteed the police a positive influence on 
children and teenagers.  
 
Conclusion 
In hindsight, a police officer remembered his return to Berlin in the early post-war years: ‘My 
hometown was a sad field of rubble…its citizens were depressed…but in this hopelessness, I 
saw a policeman regulating the traffic in front of the Brandenburg Gate--a symbol of new 
order within the chaos.’105 Indeed, traffic policing and traffic safety education came to stand 
for new order but also remained an area in which state expectations of its citizens clashed 
with public willingness to obey and follow new laws and regulations. In 1953 West 
Germany’s federal minister for traffic Dr Seebohm concluded pessimistically that decency on 
the roads had been lost and that despite efforts to re-kindle this virtue, he found: ‘…a traffic 
community is the aim of our traffic regulations but there is little of it noticeable nowadays. 
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Pedestrians, cyclists and car drivers need to take care of each other and have to get used to the 
order imposed upon them.’106 His lament was mainly directed at adults as the 1950s saw some 
new developments in reaching out to children and younger people.  
The strongly suggested link between so-called ‘traffic discipline’ and civil 
responsibility/good citizenship only partly convinced the general public.  The increasingly 
authoritarian efforts to hammer home the message of traffic safety campaigns were debated 
and often criticised with references to the Nazi period. Certainly, the accusations of ‘police 
terror’, denunciations or the fear of a new uniformed youth were also convenient for those 
who wanted to discredit the efforts and actions carried out by police forces and other state and 
local officials. Both sides based their arguments on civil responsibility, community and 
citizenship. Efforts to fight the ‘traffic problem’ were an uneasy mixture of calling for more 
self-discipline, good relations with the police and traffic decency as well as threatening with 
draconian penalties and plain-clothes police officers. While ideally traffic experts hoped that 
citizens learned from each other and behaved as one big traffic community rather than having 
to impose state authority through police forces, the reality was rather different. State official 
struggled with their own conceptual link between behaviour on the roads and behaviour as 
good/decent citizen—a concept also heavily relying on authoritarian ideas of the state. Efforts 
to include practices of denunciation within a clear democratic framework were illustrated by 
the limits of the Rechtsstaat pointed out to those who eagerly wanted to report their fellow 
citizens. The combination of civil responsibility, democratic citizenship and law abiding 
behaviour was not easily achieved especially when citizens articulated that too much state 
regulations were actually seen as reminding of anything but a new democratic society.  
The conclusion that ‘good citizens’ actually still behaved badly when it came to 
observing traffic regulations did not fit the moral and civil framework into which traffic 
policing and traffic safety education had been placed from its very beginning. The idea that 
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the rights and liberties of a citizen could also mean making wrong decisions and then having 
to deal with the consequences of this behaviour (legal ones or otherwise) featured little in the 
1940s and 1950s debates about traffic safety. The Eigensinn of the public choosing to ignore 
traffic rules, despite better knowledge, was impossible to reconcile with the authoritarian and 
patronising pedagogical approach so obvious in traffic safety debates of the 1940s and 1950s. 
At the same time, citizens also negotiated their participation in this process by using a variety 
of options available to them on an individual basis. Some actively participated through local 
traffic safety organisations or by reporting wrongdoings, others complained about state 
interference, over-policing and being publicly told how to behave. Even though officials and 
policemen would have preferred the public to behave differently, West Germans contributed 
in their own and personal ways to the re-negotiation of post-war attitudes on citizenship, state 
interference, individual responsibility and civil society. 
 
 
